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MAKING A CASE FOR STATUTORY
AMENDMENT TO THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT
("CERCLA"): SOLVING THE SECTION 107/
SECTION 113 CAUSE OF ACTION
CONTROVERSY
I. INTRODUcrION
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act ("CERCLA")' section 107,2 a "person ' 3 who
incurs response costs in cleaning up a contaminated site may sue other
parties responsible for the contamination for recovery of those costs.'
The definition of "person" under CERCLA does not exclude poten-
tially responsible parties ("PRPs") who themselves may have contrib-
uted to the environmental damage.5 Therefore, under a literal
reading of the statute, a PRP may bring a CERCLA section 107 cost
recovery action against fellow PRPs.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
3. CERCLA defines a "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partner-
ship, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipal-
ity, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)
(1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section...
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence or
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for...
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan.
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4) (B) (1988).
Further, liability under § 9607 (a) (4) (B) is subject to certain enumerated defenses, such as
acts beyond the control of the defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (b) (1-4).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21).
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Likewise, under CERCLA section 113,6 a "person ' 7 may seek
contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable
for contaminating a site.8 Therefore, it would seem that a PRP who
incurs response costs in remedying a contaminated site has recourse to
either a CERCLA section 107 cost recovery action or a CERCLA
section 113 contribution action against fellow PRPs who have not
shouldered their burden in remedying a contaminated site. The his-
tory of CERCLA and evolving case law indicates, however, that de-
pending upon the specific issue of the case, PRPs may be limited in
what remedy is available. Despite the vague and open-ended lan-
guage of the statute, PRPs are often limited in their remedy depend-
ing upon their motivation for seeking cost recovery under
section 107. 9
II. HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION
The administrative process of cleaning up a contaminated site
under CERCLA is extremely complex. The following represents a
typical, but by no means exclusive, scenario which leads to individual
liability under CERCLA.
The President becomes aware of a potentially contaminated
site.10 After conducting a preliminary investigation," the President
then places the site on its National Priorities List ("NPL") if it finds
that the site poses serious risks to the health of the surrounding
population.' 2
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1988).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (f) (1) (1988) provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or poten-
tially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under
section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be
brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allo-
cate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court deter-
mines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person
to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of
this title or section 9607 of this title.
Id.
9. See Ann Alexander, Standing Under Superfund §§ 107 And 113: Avoiding The Error Of
The Blind Man And The Elephant, 10 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 155 (July 12, 1995) [hereinafter
Standing Under Superfund].
10. It is the duty of anyone "in charge of a vessel or... facility" to immediately notify the
National Response Center of a release or threat of a release of hazardous substances. The Na-
tional Response Center then notifies all appropriate state and federal agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 9603
(a) (1988).
11. The procedure for such an investigation is found in 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (b) (1988).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (g) (2) (1988).
[Vol. 31:851
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In order to enforce these findings, the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA"), acting on behalf of the President,
can then do one of three things. 3 It could undertake remedial action
itself and then sue the responsible parties for recovery of costs under
section 107, or it could sue in a district court for an injunction forcing
responsible parties to stop polluting the site.14 Lastly, and most ger-
mane to the following discussion, the EPA could issue an administra-
tive order under CERCLA section 10615 directing specified
responsible parties to clean up the site at their own expense.'
6
When commanded to clean up a site pursuant to a CERCLA sec-
tion 106 Order, a private party has two options. First, it can ignore the
Order and face a penalty of $25,000 per day for each day it fails to
comply.17 On the other hand, it can shoulder the expense for remedy-
ing the site in order to avoid the penalty associated with non-
compliance.
Because a party who complies with a section 106 Order often
bears the cost of remedying what several hundred parties have done in
the way of environmental harm, CERCLA provides legislative reme-
dies in order to compensate those who undertake remedial measures.
These are the cost recovery action allowed by section 107 and the con-
tribution action allowed by section 113.18
13. Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (D.N.J. 1992).
14. ld.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (a) (1988) provides:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the
President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened
release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney General
of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or
threat, and the district court of the United States in the district in which the threat
occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest and the equities
of the case may require. The President may also, after notice to the affected State, take
other action under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may
be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the environment.
Id.
16. Transtech, 798 F. Supp. at 1084.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (b) (1) reads:
Any person who, without sufficient cause, willfully violates, or falls or refuses to
comply with, any order of the President under subsection (a) of this section may, in an
action brought in the appropriate United States district court to enforce such order, be
fined not more than $25,000 for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure
to comply continues.
Id.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4) (b) and 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (f) (1).
1996]
3
Buckley: Making a Case for Statutory Amendment to the Comprehensive Enviro
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31:851
The EPA will usually send out notices to all known and suspected
PRPs informing them of their potential liability.19 These parties may
settle their liability with the EPA in an approved settlement.20 CER-
CLA provides protection to PRPs who settle with the EPA by disal-
lowing other private parties from seeking contribution from them in
future litigation.2
III. THEISiS
This commentary will note the unmistakable trend in case law
which demonstrates that a PRP is always entitled to contribution from
other PRPs who have not settled their liability with the United States
government under CERCLA section 113. A PRP who seeks cost re-
covery under section 107 is entitled to cost recovery when it seeks to
establish joint and several liability among defendant PRPs. Courts are
evenly split on whether a PRP may maintain a CERCLA section 107
cost recovery action when seeking to invoke the longer statute of limi-
tations available for cost recovery actions under CERCLA. Lastly,
courts almost unanimously reject a PRP cost recovery action when a
plaintiff PRP seeks to circumvent contribution protection afforded to
19. A notice sent to a PRP is usually in the form of service of process, and "process may be
served in any district where the defendant is found, resides, transacts business, or has appointed
an agent for the service of process" under CERCLA's nationwide service of process provisions.
42 U.S.C. § 9613 (e) (1988).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (a) provides:
The President, in his discretion, may enter into an agreement with any person (in-
cluding the owner or operator of the facility from which a release or substantial threat
of a release emanates, or any other potentially responsible person), to perform any
response action... if the President determines that such action will be done properly
by such person. Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the
President, the President shall act to facilitate agreements under this section that are in
the public interest and consistent with the National Contingency Plan in order to expe-
dite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation. If the President decides not to
use the procedures in this section, the President shall notify in writing potentially re-
sponsible parties at the facility of such decision and the reasons why use of the proce-
dures is inappropriate. A decision of the President to use or not to use the procedures
in this section is not subject to judicial review.
Ild.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (g) (4) (1988). "A settlement [between the EPA and a PRP] shall be
entered as a consent decree or embodied in an administrative order setting forth the terms of the
settlement." Id.
42 U.S.C. § 9622 (g) (5) reads:
A party who has resolved its liability to the United States under this subsection
shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settle-
ment. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially responsible par-
ties unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the
amount of the settlement.
Id. Further, CERCLA's contribution section contains a nearly identical provision. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613 (f) (2).
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss4/7
THE CASE TO AMEND CERCLA
defendant PRPs who have settled their liability with the United States
government.22
The only situation in which the majority of courts will allow a
plaintiff PRP to bring a CERCLA section 107 cost recovery action is
when the plaintiff PRP seeks to establish joint and several liability
among the defendant PRPs. This commentary will urge an amend-
ment to CERCLA repealing the amendments to CERCLA which pro-
vided for the expressed contribution action because this distinction is
discordant with Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA. CERCLA
should be restored to its original language with an extra provision per-
mitting only the application of common law contribution principles to
augment the original text. Further, a recently attempted amendment
to CERCLA will be shown to be in complete accord with the drafters'
intent while providing an equitable resolution to the hazards in apply-
ing joint and several liability.
IV. DISCUSSION
Courts which have addressed whether a PRP may bring a CER-
CLA section 107 cost recovery action or a CERCLA section 113 con-
tribution action are almost evenly split.23 Consistencies are apparent,
however, when one examines the historical development of CERCLA
in conjunction with the motivation of the plaintiff PRP in bringing a
CERCLA section 107 action.
A. Historical Development
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA with two overriding objec-
tives: to furnish the federal government with the tools necessary to
promptly and effectively respond to national problems resulting from
the disposal of hazardous waste; and to make those responsible for
creating these problems "bear the costs and responsibility for remedy-
ing the harmful conditions they created."'24
22. Ann Alexander, Toward A Comprehensive Understanding Of The Relationship Between
CERCLA §§ 107 And 113,10 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 184 (July 19,1995) [hereinafter Comprehen-
sive Understanding].
23. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 159. Alexander compares several cases
which support a plaintiff PRP's right to bring a § 107 cost recovery action with a similar number
denying the same.
24. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,1081 (1st Cir. 1986)
(quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)).
1996)
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The original CERCLA legislation did not provide for a contribu-
tion action.25 Rather, under the original language, a person who in-
curred response costs found his sole remedy in a CERCLA
section 107 cost recovery action. 6 The relevant text of section 107 has
remained relatively unchanged since its initial enactment.2 7
Prior to 1986, courts applied common law principles to controver-
sies which arose under the statute to recognize an implied right of
contribution among PRPs. s Courts generally handled the issue of
contribution among joint tortfeasors by bifurcating trials into a liabil-
ity phase and a subsequent cost allocation phase.29 Courts applied
common law principles regarding joint tortfeasors to hold PRPs
jointly and severally liable unless the harm was shown to be divisi-
ble. ° Therefore, in the early years of CERCLA litigation, plaintiff
PRPs could sue for cost recovery under section 107 during the liability
phase of the trial; during the cost allocation phase, courts would hold
defendant PRPs to be jointly and severally liable unless they could
show the total contamination at a site was divisible and each defend-
ant's contribution to the damage could be assessed individually.31
25. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 157.
26. Id. at 156.
27. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1994) with 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1980).
28. Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 157.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 156.
31. Id. Prior to SARA, the federal courts' position on contribution can be best summed up
by the following sections of the RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRS:
§ 886A. Contribution Among Tortfeasors
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2), (3) and (4), when two or more persons
become liable in tort to the same person for the same harm, there is a right of
contribution among them, even though judgment has not been recovered against
all or any of them.(2) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has discharged
the entire claim for the harm by paying more than his equitable share of the com-
mon liability, and is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his share. No
tortfeasor can be required to make contribution beyond his own equitable share of
the liability.
(3) There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intention-
ally caused the harm.(4) When one tortfeasor has a right of indemnity against another, neither of them
has a right of contribution against the other.
RESTATE MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979).
§ 433A. Apportionment of Harm to Causes(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause
to a single harm.(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more
causes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
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In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA with the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA").3 2 In enacting
SARA, Congress sought to "clarify and confirm" a judicially estab-
lished right to contribution under CERCLA section 107.11 Congress
thus added an express right to contribution to the CERCLA legisla-
tion. In seeking to merely codify the development of CERCLA in the
courts, Congress created a sharp division in federal courts over how
the new language was to be interpreted. 34 This controversy exists to
this day.
Following SARA, CERCLA contained two express causes of ac-
tion for a "person" who incurs response costs: a section 107 cost re-
covery action and a section 113 contribution action. These actions
differ in three primary respects. First, section 107 imposes joint and
several liability upon defendant PRPs whereas section 113 imposes
only several liability on defendant PRPs. Second, section 107 actions
are governed by a six year statute of limitations whereas section 113
actions are governed by a three year statute of limitations. Finally,
section 107 actions do not recognize the statutory contribution protec-
tion afforded defendant PRPs who settle their liability with the United
States government, whereas section 113 contribution actions apply
statutory contribution protection afforded similarly situated defendant
PRPs
B. Joint and Several Liability
Plaintiff PRPs often bring a CERCLA section 107 cost recovery
action in order to achieve joint and several liability among the defend-
ant PRPs. Joint and several liability among defendant PRPs inures
certain benefits to the plaintiff.
§ 881. Distinct or Divisable Harms
If two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously cause distinct harms or a single
harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division according to the contribution of
each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of the total harm that he has him-
self caused.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 881 (1979).
32. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986).
33. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 157.
This section clarifies and confirms the right of a person held jointly and severally liable
under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties, when the
person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater
than its equitable share under the circumstances.
H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861.
34. See supra note 23.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (f) (2) (1988).
1996]
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A plaintiff PRP often sues several hundred defendant PRPs to
recover the funds it expended in cleaning up a contaminated site.
Each defendant PRP is assessed certain shares which correspond to its
perceived liability.36 In most cases, the cleanup comes several years
after the contamination of the site. At the point of litigation, many of
these defendant PRPs are either long since dissolved corporations, in-
solvent parties, or parties which cannot be located.37
If a plaintiff PRP cannot bring an action against jointly and sever-
ally liable defendants, that plaintiff will have to absorb the shares and
thus the liability of the defendants who, for whatever reason, cannot
pay 38 These so-called "orphan shares" often represent a substantial
portion of the costs a plaintiff PRP will spend.39 Making plaintiff
PRPs pay for the orphan shares hardly comports with the CERCLA
drafters' original intent of making responsible parties pay their share
of the damages.40
Most courts which have been faced with a plaintiff PRP who
wishes to sue under CERCLA section 107 in order to make the de-
fendants jointly and severally liable have allowed the plaintiff PRPs to
maintain a section 107 action.4' The decision of the Eastern District
of Virginia in Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v.
Peck Iron & Metal Co.42 is a typical example of these courts'
reasoning.
In Chesapeake, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia issued a memorandum opinion in response to cross
motions for summary judgment.43 Peck Iron and Metal Company and
its co-defendants ("Peck") raised the issue of Chesapeake and Poto-
mac Telephone Company's ("C&P") standing to bring a section 107
cost recovery action." Peck argued that because C&P was itself a
PRP, C&P could only bring a contribution action under section 113 .4
Because C&P could only sue for contribution, "joint and several lia-
bility [was] not available. 46
36. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 160.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Dedham Water, 805 F.2d at 1081.
41. See Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 22.
42. 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
43. Id. at 1271.
44. Id. at 1273, 1277.
45. Id. at 1273.
46. Id.
[Vol. 31:851
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The Court ruled C&P was entitled to maintain its action under
section 107, stating "[t]here is nothing in the language of the statute [ ]
that precludes a party, like C&P, itself liable under CERCLA, to initi-
ate cleanup and sue to recover its costs under Section 107."14 The
Court thus recognized the absence of limiting language in the statute
following SARA. The plain language of CERCLA does not preclude
a person from maintaining a section 107 cost recovery action even
though it may not be an "innocent" party.'
The Court also recognized there were two phases to the upcom-
ing trial. After ruling that liability could be imposed upon the defend-
ant PRPs under section 107, the Court stated that "[a]t the
contribution phase of this proceeding, the Court will, as a first cut at
apportioning liability, determine a 'Plaintiff's share' and a 'Defend-
ant's share."' 49
Further, the Court noted the imposition of joint and several lia-
bility upon defendant PRPs depended upon establishing that the harm
done to the contaminated site was indivisible.5" After adopting the
Restatement standard for imposing joint and several liability,5' the
Eastern District of Virginia then ruled that "the imposition of joint
and several liability turns upon whether there is a reasonable basis for
determining the contribution of each defendant to the harm at the
Site."52
Thus, the Court remained true to the original text of CERCLA
by allowing C&P to maintain its section 107 cost recovery action. In
doing so, the Eastern District of Virginia did not do violence to Con-
gress' intent in amending CERCLA with SARA, which sought to clar-
ify and confirm the existing law. C&P was therefore successful in
maintaining its section 107 action because it did not seek to use
SARA and its vague language to its advantage: C&P asked for no
more than it would have received under the original text of the
statute.
47. Id. at 1277.
48. Id. ("Nothing in the statute supports the assertion that only... an 'innocent' plaintiff
can bring a cost recovery action under Section 107 (a).").
49. Id. at 1277-78.
50. Id. at 1279.
51. Id. at 1278-79 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
52. Id. at 1279.
1996]
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C. Statute of Limitations
Congress provides for a six year statute of limitations on private
party section 107 cost recovery actions.5 3 In contrast, Congress, in en-
acting the SARA amendments to CERCLA in 1986, provides for a
three year statute of limitations for express contribution actions under
CERCLA section 113.14
Plaintiff PRPs often will sue under CERCLA section 107 in order
to take advantage of the longer statute of limitations.55 When
presented with this motivation, courts are evenly split on whether the
plaintiff PRP may maintain this cost recovery action.56
In United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc.,7 the Northern
District of Indiana issued an Order in response to the third party de-
fendant PRPs' Motion to Dismiss.58 These third party defendant
PRPs ("Omnisource") argued that the third party plaintiff PRP
("SCA") was limited to a section 113 contribution claim and subject to
the shorter three year statute of limitations.5 9 If SCA could not main-
tain a section 107 cost recovery action, its claims against Omnisource
would be time-barred.60
The Northern District of Indiana relied upon the District of New
Jersey's reasoning in Transtech Industries, Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean61
to determine the issue of which statute of limitations applied.62 After
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (g) (2) (B) (1988). "An initial action for the recovery of the costs
referred to in section 9607 of this title must be commenced ... for a remedial action, within 6
years after the initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action... ." Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (g) (3) (1988) reads:
No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced
more than 3 years after...
(A) the date of judgment in any action under this chapter for recovery of such
costs or damages, or
(B) the date of an administrative order under section 9622(g) of this title (relating
to de minimis settlements) or 9622(h) of this title (relating to cost recovery settle-
ments) or entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or
damages.
Id.
55. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 156.
56. See Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 22, at 184.
57. 849 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
58. Id. at 1267.
59. Id. at 1269.
60. See id. at 1270.
61. 798 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.L 1992).
62. SCA Services, 849 F. Supp. at 1271-72.
[Vol. 31:851
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concluding "that a potentially responsible party may bring a cost re-
covery action against other responsible parties under CERCLA sec-
tion 107,"63 the Court then turned to the facts of the case to justify the
use of the longer statute of limitations.
SCA argued that "in a cost recovery action an accurate picture of
the costs involved in a cleanup will not emerge until a cleanup is un-
derway, which can be many years after entry of a consent decree. 64
The consent decree triggers the three year statute of limitations for
contribution actions.65
Further, the government entered into the consent decree with
SCA in 1989.66 The Court noted that there was a natural "time lag
between the decision to cleanup a site and the incurrence of [re-
sponse] costs," because the EPA "must approve the various work
plans involved in a remedial action." 67 SCA did not have the opportu-
nity to begin removing drums from the site until three years after the
entry of the consent decree.68 The Court used these facts to illustrate
the potential inequity if SCA were denied standing to sue under sec-
tion 107 based solely upon its status as a PRP.
The ffipside of the reasoning in SCA Services is the reasoning of
the First Circuit Court of Appeals in United Technologies Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.69 In 1982, the government ordered
the Inmont Corporation to clean up a contaminated site.70 Then in
1986, the government and Inmont entered into a consent decree.7'
Sometime after 1982, United Technologies Corp. ("UTC") acquired
Inmont and all of its respective liabilities.7' UTC then sued various
defendants ("BFI") in 1992 before the expiration of the six-year stat-
ute of limitations governing cost recovery actions.73
The First Circuit looked solely to the status of UTC as a PRP in
ruling UTC could not maintain its section 107 cost recovery action:
63. Id. at 1281.
64. Id. at 1283.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (g) (3).
66. SCA Services, 849 F. Supp. at 1268.
67. Id. at 1283.
68. Id.
69. 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994).
70. Id. at 97.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
1996]
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The word "contribution" . . . should be given its plain meaning.
Adapted to an environmental case, it refers to an action by a re-
sponsible party to recover from another responsible party that por-
tion of its costs that are in excess of its pro rata share of the
aggregate response costs .... Applying this definition, the instant
action clearly qualifies as an action for contribution .... And be-
cause CERCLA's text indicates that contribution and cost recovery
are distinct, non-overlapping anodynes, the action had to be com-
menced within three years of its accrual.74
The First Circuit worried applying section 107 to a case in which a
PRP sues other PRPs "would completely swallow section 9613(g)(3)'s
three year statute of limitations associated with actions for contribu-
tion." 75 The Court did not wish to nullify an entire subsection of
SARA.76
The United Technologies ruling was entirely consistent with the
language of CERCLA following SARA in 1986 with regard to contri-
bution actions. The application of either the six year statute of limita-
tions or the three year statute of limitations turns entirely on whether
a court wishes to allow the PRP to maintain a section 107 action.
The statute of limitations issue illuminates a tremendous short-
coming of CERCLA following SARA. Before SARA, Congress pro-
vided no statute of limitations for a private party cost recovery
action.77 Then Congress enacted SARA as merely a codification of
the law as it had developed.78 In creating the new cause of action for
contribution, Congress muddied the waters of CERCLA litigation,
and the end result is a decision such as United Technologies, which is
wholly consistent with the amended statute, while destroying the law
as it had existed prior to SARA. Thus, Congress achieved a result
opposite to its intent in enacting SARA.7 9
74. Id. at 103.
75. Id. at 101.
76. Id.
77. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
78. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 157.
79. Ann Alexander offers an interesting analysis of the statute of limitations issue as it
pertains to CERCLA § 107 and § 113 actions in Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 22, at
184 n.64:
One could argue that a longer statute of limitations would encourage settlement by
reducing a potential obstacle to cost recovery or that a longer statute makes procedural
sense where a PRP has initiated a cleanup rather than reimbursing someone else, since
it takes longer in such a circumstance to determine the extent of the costs for which
reimbursement will be sought. However, neither of these considerations constitutes
anything approaching a genuine disincentive to settlement associated with the shorter
statute. In any event, unlike ... other ... concerns associated with the §107/§113
controversy, the statute of limitations question cannot always be resolved merely by
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D. Contribution Protection
When PRPs settle their liability for contaminating a site with the
United States government, they receive statutory contribution protec-
tion which grants them immunity from future private party contribu-
tion actions, provided the claimant seeks contribution for "matters
addressed" in the approved settlement agreement.80 Thus, a plaintiff
PRP may not bring a section 113 contribution action against settling
defendant PRPs for matters addressed in the settlement. As a result,
plaintiff PRPs often bring a section 107 cost recovery action in order
to circumvent this statutory contribution protection.8'
Courts have unanimously rejected claims for cost recovery under
section 107 when a plaintiff PRP seeks cost recovery in order to cir-
cumvent contribution protection. 82 In Transtech Industries, Inc. v. A
& Z Septic Clean, 3 the plaintiff PRPs ("Transtech") sued the defend-
ant PRPs ("A & Z") under CERCLA section 107 seeking cost recov-
ery.84 A group of defendants who had settled their liability with the
EPA ("settlers") moved to dismiss the complaint against them by in-
voking the statutory contribution protection enacted by the 1986
SARA amendments. 85 Transtech, in filing its section 107 cost recov-
ery action, sought to avoid the contribution protection by reaching the
settlers through a different cause of action. 6
The court ultimately ruled A & Z's motion to dismiss must fail
because it sought contribution protection for matters not addressed by
their settlement agreements with the government.87 The court, how-
ever, was careful to explain that Transtech's sole cause of action was
categorizing the action as either a § 107 cost recovery claim or a § 113 contribution
claim. Section 113(g)(2) purports to define the limitations period for "Actions for re-
covery of costs," while § 113(g)(3) purports to define the limitations period for "contri-
bution." However, the § 113(g)(3) 3-year period begins to run only upon entry of ajudgment, administrative order, or judicially approved settlement. Thus, a court could
categorize a liable party as a § 113 contribution plaintiff, but the § 113(g)(3) limitations
period would not apply to that party's action if its costs were incurred voluntarily, with-
out judicial or administrative intervention.
Id.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (g) (4) (1988).
81. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 156.
82. See Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 22, at 184.
83. 798 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1992).
84. Id. at 1085.
85. Id. at 1084.
86. Id. at 1085.
87. Id. at 1090.
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one for contribution.88 The court reasoned section 107 merely author-
ized the section 113 contribution action.89
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also refused to recognize a
plaintiff PRP's section 107 cost recovery action in Akzo Coatings, Inc.
v. Aigner Corp.9 ° Akzo sought cost recovery from Aigner, which had
previously settled its liability with the EPA.91
The Seventh Circuit went even further than the New Jersey Dis-
trict Court had in Transtech in ruling Akzo could only pursue a sec-
tion 113 contribution action:
Akzo has experienced no injury of the kind that would typically give
rise to a direct claim under section 107(a)-it is not, for example, a
landowner forced to clean up hazardous materials that a third party
spilled onto its property or that migrated there from adjacent lands.
Instead, Akzo itself is a party liable in some measure for the con-
tamination at the Fisher-Calo site, and the gist of Akzo's claim is
that the costs it has incurred should be apportioned equitably
amongst itself and the others responsible .... That is a quintessen-
tial claim for contribution .... Whatever label Akzo may wish to
use, its claim remains one by and between jointly and severally lia-
ble parties for an appropriate division of the payment one of them
has been compelled to make.92
An analysis of cases in which a plaintiff PRP seeks to sue defend-
ant PRPs under section 107 for cost recovery in order to circumvent
the contribution protection afforded settling PRPs reveal that courts
generally find the suit to be one for contribution alone.93 Thus, contri-
bution protection applies if the suit covers matters addressed in the
settlement.
Courts likely rule this way for two reasons. First, in trying to es-
cape contribution protection, plaintiff PRPs attempt to use a literal
reading of CERCLA following SARA to circumvent the defendant
PRPs' right to contribution protection, a right recognized by the
courts prior to CERCLA. In doing so, courts try to preserve the judi-
cially recognized contribution action which existed prior to SARA. If
the intent of SARA was to clarify and confirm the existing law, al-
lowing plaintiff PRPs to skirt this existing law because of a strained
88. Id. at 1086.
89. Id.
90. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 762-63.
92. 1d. at 764 (internal citations omitted).
93. See Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 22, at 184.
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interpretation of the amendment would be directly contradictory to
the intent of the drafters of the amendments. 4
Second, in attempting to use CERCLA to circumvent contribu-
tion protection as to matters addressed, the plaintiff PRPs bring the
nature of the action into issue. Whereas the imposition of joint and
several liability focuses on the liability among guilty parties and the
choice of statute of limitations focuses on equitable factors, an avoid-
ance of contribution protection causes the court to examine the exact
nature of the suit. Since courts are guided by the SARA amendments
to CERCLA, they logically determine that the plaintiff PRPs are, in
essence, seeking contribution and not cost recovery. While this appli-
cation may ignore the literal language of section 107, which provides
cost recovery for all persons, including PRPs, it allows a court to pre-
vent plaintiff PRPs from using a defense to contribution protection
which did not exist in the courts prior to SARA or in the language of
the amendments.
V. THE DANGEROUS TREND
Recently, courts have begun to deny a PRP the statutory right to
bring a section 107 cost recovery action based solely upon its standing
as a PRP. The Tenth Circuit has issued two recent decisions which
exemplify this dangerous trend.
In United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co.,95 the EPA
filed suit in 1989 against all known PRPs seeking recovery of response
costs incurred since a contaminated site had been placed on the Na-
tional Priorities List in 1983.96 As a result of the suit, two of the de-
fendant PRPs, McKesson and Farmland, settled their liability with the
EPA and "agreed to finance and perform all remediation of the
site."' 97 In total, the two PRPs spent in excess of $15 million to clean
up the site.93
In 1992, three other defendant PRPs, Colorado & Eastern Rail-
road Co., Great Northern Transportation Co., and Flanders ("the
CERC parties") settled their liability with the EPA.99 Soon thereaf-
ter, the defendant PRPs filed cross claims against each other.1"' All of
94. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 157.
95. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
96. Id. at 1532-33.
97. Id. at 1533.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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these claims were settled or dismissed prior to trial except Farmland's
claim against the CERC parties. 01 Farmland sued for cost recovery
under CERCLA section 107 and alternatively, contribution under
CERCLA section 113.'1 The CERC parties moved for summary
judgment, asserting that Farmland's contribution claims were barred
by statutory contribution protection available to settling parties under
CERCLA section 113.103 The trial court denied the motion because
the CERC parties had yet to pay the EPA the agreed amount. 1 4 The
court also determined there was a "genuine issue of material fact [re-
garding] the scope of the contribution protection afforded by [the]
consent decree" the CERC parties entered into with the
government. 0 5
At trial, the District Court for the District of Colorado entered
judgment for Farmland under CERCLA section 107.106 The Court
also ruled that liability could have been apportioned under sec-
tion 113, but the CERC parties had failed to counterclaim for contri-
bution.10 7 Since Farmland's remedy was under section 107, the Court
passed on the issue of contribution protection.0 8
The Tenth Circuit reversed. 0 9 The court ruled "[w]hatever label
Farmland may wish to use, its claim remains one by and between
jointly and severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the
payment one of them has been compelled to make."' 10 The court also
held that "Farmland's claim against the CERC parties must be classi-
fied as one for contribution.""' In so ruling the court focused solely
on the parties' status as PRPs: "There is no disagreement that both
parties are PRPs by virtue of their past or present ownership of the
site; therefore, any claim that would reapportion costs between these
parties is the quintessential claim for contribution.""' 2
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id
105. Id. at 1533-34.
106. Id. at 1534.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1534, 1536.
110. Id. at 1536.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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The United States District Court for the District of Utah followed
the bright line test of Colorado & Eastern in Ekotek Site PRP Com-
mittee v. Self.1 3 In 1988, the EPA assumed control of a site to begin
an "emergency removal to [halt] the release of hazardous
substances."" 4
In 1988, the EPA notified a group of corporations who were po-
tentially liable for the contamination at the site." 5 Forty-nine of these
corporations formed the plaintiff Ekotek Site Committee." 6 This
group formed in order to negotiate with the EPA and to undertake
investigation and response action at the site." 7 The defendants were
a group of PRPs who allegedly contributed to the contamination at
the site but were not part of the Committee." 8
In response to joint motions for summary judgment, the District
Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order." 9 Addressing
whether a PRP may bring a cost recovery action under CERCLA sec-
tion 107,120 the court withheld ruling on this issue until the Tenth Cir-
cuit issued its final disposition in Colorado & Eastern.'2' The court
followed the Tenth Circuit's reasoning and held the Ekotek Site Com-
mittee, by virtue of its status as a PRP, was precluded from bringing
an action for cost recovery under section 107.122
This approach is in direct conflict with a recent ruling of the
United States Supreme Court. In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,"3
the Court stated, albeit in dicta, that SARA did not abrogate the abil-
ity of a private party to bring a cost recovery action under sec-
tion 107.124 While one would expect this statement to be dispositive of
113. 881 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Utah 1995).
114. Id at 1518.
115. Id. at 1519.
116. Id.
117. I&
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1518.
120. Id. at 1520.
121. Id. at 1521.
122. Id.
123. 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
124. Id. at 1965-66. The Court stated:
The 1986 SARA amendments included a provision-CERCLA § 113(f)-that ex-
pressly created a cause of action for contribution. Other SARA provisions, moreover,
appeared to endorse the judicial decisions recognizing a cause of action under § 107 by
prresupposing that such an action existed .... Thus the statute now expressly autho-
rizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and
somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107.
Id (internal citations omitted).
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the issue, subsequent lower federal courts continue to dissect the is-
sue. The Tenth Circuit trend approach has elucidated that a PRP can-
not bring a cost recovery action under section 107 based solely upon
its status as a PRP, which is inconsistent with both Key Tronic and the
plain language of the statute.
VI. STATUTORY AMENDMENT IS NECESSARY TO RESTORE
CERCLA TO ITS ORIGINAL INTENT
Following the SARA amendments to CERCLA in 1986, a major-
ity of courts have only been willing to allow a PRP to bring a cost
recovery action under CERCLA section 107 when a plaintiff PRP
wishes to establish joint and several liability between defendant PRPs.
Congress must reexamine CERCLA as it currently stands, because
this distinction is discordant with the legislative intent surrounding
CERCLA'I and the SARA amendments. 26
The original CERCLA legislation only provided for the sec-
tion 107 cost recovery action, which was available to all persons under
CERCLA, including PRPs.12 7 An unbridled ability of PRPs to re-
cover costs was tempered by the bifurcated trial mechanism; liability
was assessed under section 107 in the liability phase and blame was
assessed by applying common law principles in the cost allocation
phase.12 The cost allocation phase applied joint and several liability
among defendant PRPs unless the harm was shown to be divisible, in
which case, liability was several only.129
Congress attempted to "clarify and confirm" the evolution of case
law under CERCLA by codifying the judicial decisions handed down
between 1980 and 1986.130 In trying to codify judicial law, however,
Congress, in using such limiting language, confused the issue. Follow-
ing SARA, courts could no longer look to common law principles to
supplement the statute; they were bound by the vague provisions of
the statute and the similarly vague legislative history in ruling on
whether a PRP may bring a cost recovery action under CERCLA
section 107.
125. See Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 22.
126. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 157.
127. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
supra note 77.
128. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 157.
129. Id. at 156.
130. Id.
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An historical legal analogy will be helpful in recognizing the ef-
fect of the SARA amendments. The implementation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence regarding privilege are instructive on the shortcom-
ings of enacting law which attempts to cover all minutia of a given
issue, leaving no room for the courts to apply the law.
Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence covers privilege. 31
As enacted, Article V contains only one rule, Rule 501.132 Rule 501 is
extremely open ended, allowing federal courts to apply the law of
privilege as "governed by the principles of the common law.., in light
of reason and experience.' 1 33 Courts thus have the latitude to experi-
ment and adapt while enjoying a long-standing body of common law
to use as a point of reference and justification.
The drafters of the original version of Article V submitted thir-
teen rules to Congress in 1973.14 Of these thirteen rules, nine defined
specific non-constitutional privileges.3 5 Three of the rules governed
waiver of privilege.136 The remaining rule was an exclusivity provision
which mandated that federal courts could only apply the enumerated
privileges of Article V or other privileges which were established by
statute.3 7
The House Committee on the Judiciary amended the proposed
Article V to include only Rule 501.138 The House sought to leave the
law of privilege as it had developed in the courts while leaving open
the possibility for future development. 39 The Conference Committee
eventually adopted this version of Article V.140
Clearly, the Congress, in promulgating the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence governing privilege, was faced with a dilemma. It could either
131. FED. R. EviD. 501.
132. Id. The rule reads:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or a political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience ....
Id.
133. Id.
134. House Comm. of Judiciary, FED. R. EvD., H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. "IT]he Committee, through a single Rule, 501, left the law of privileges in its present
state and further provided that privileges shall continue to be developed by the courts of the
United States." Id.
140. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974).
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accept an extensive and enumerated version of Article V as drafted by
the Advisory Committee, or it could amend that proposal to accom-
modate the law of privilege as developed in the courts. In amending
the proposal, Congress could also insert a provision which would al-
low the law of privilege to develop as it had previously, through court
decision. Congress chose to amend the proposal, cutting Article V
from thirteen rules to one rule.
Congress was faced with a similar dilemma in enacting the SARA
amendments to CERCLA in 1986. Courts had developed the law sur-
rounding section 107 cost recovery actions to the point where a PRP
who incurred response costs could sue other PRPs under section 107
in the liability phase of trial. Under the bifurcated scheme, in the cost
allocation phase of trial, liability among the parties could be deter-
mined. Courts applied joint and several liability unless the harm done
to a site was shown to be divisible.
Congress thus had three potential choices when contemplating
SARA: leave the law alone as it stood; amend CERCLA to include
an expressed cause of action for contribution which, in theory, would
clarify and confirm the existing law; or amend CERCLA to provide
for the bifurcated trial mechanism and joint and several liability
among defendant PRPs unless the harm done to the site was shown to
be divisible. Congress chose to amend CERCLA to include an ex-
pressed contribution action under section 113.141
Following the analogy of the promulgation of the Federal Rules
of Evidence regarding privilege, Congress should have left CERCLA
alone in 1986. The only material difference between the codification
of privilege law and the enactment of SARA was that there was no
federal rule of privilege before the promulgation of Article V of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Therefore, the enactment of Rule 501 it-
self was merely an open-ended codification of the notion that the law
of privilege should be made by the courts.
By 1986, CERCLA had been law for six years. As it stood, the
law was composed of a relatively vague statutory section which
granted any person the right to sue for the recovery of costs along
with a fairly uniform body of case law defining the scope of this vague
statutory provision. Then, by amending CERCLA to include the sec-
tion 113 contribution action in an attempt to clarify and confirm the
existing law, Congress did exactly what it sought to avoid when it had
141. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986).
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previously balked at the original thirteen rules regarding privilege. In
terms of privilege law, Congress did not want to expressly enumerate
each privilege because to do so would inherently limit the scope of
privilege law as it had developed in the courts over the years. Like-
wise, the law of privilege had reached the point it was at the time of
the implementation of the Federal Rules of Evidence through judicial
decisions, and to pigeonhole the entire body of common law privilege
into thirteen tidy rules would result in freezing the evolution of privi-
lege law.
In enacting SARA, and specifically section 113, Congress both
crippled and confused the existing law regarding cost recovery under
CERCLA. Section 113 froze the courts' ability to apply general prin-
ciples to factually distinct situations. Section 113 implicitly abrogated
joint and several liability as it applies to actions between liable parties.
Section 113 also imposed a new statute of limitations which could be
used to bar actions which would have been timely prior to SARA.
Congress should not have amended CERCLA to include an ex-
pressed cause of action for contribution. An implied right of contribu-
tion existed beforehand when courts only had section 107 to apply. 4 a
Under the bifurcated scheme, the courts could assess liability between
the defendant PRP's in the cost allocation phase of trial. 4 3 Contribu-
tion was already available to defendant PRPs.'4
Congress should, therefore, amend CERCLA by repealing sec-
tion 113 and all related provisions which apply to the expressed right
of contribution. Congress should instead insert a provision in CER-
CLA similar to that used in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, allowing the courts to apply common law principles regarding
contribution to section 107 cost recovery actions. Liability should be
presumptively joint and several unless the harm is shown to be divisi-
ble. Only one statute of limitations should apply to these actions.
Likewise, there should be no contribution protection afforded to de-
fendant PRPs who settle their liability with the government. Settle-
ment with the government is definitely within the interest of judicial
economy and efficiency, but one must remember the overriding objec-
tives of CERCLA - to promptly and efficiently address the hazardous
142. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 157.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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waste disposal problem and to make those guilty of contaminating a
site pay their share of the costs.145
Settlement with the EPA should thus be phased out of the proce-
dural scheme of remedying a site. The EPA should simply issue a sec-
tion 106 order compelling one or more parties to clean up a site.
These parties can then sue under section 107 to recover costs from
other PRPs. These costs should include investigation fees incurred in
trying to locate all other potentially responsible parties. The Supreme
Court has recognized that investigation fees are recoverable as costs
by plaintiff PRPs under section 107.146
The notion of joint and several liability among defendant PRPs in
a cost recovery action allows the plaintiff to recover its total damage.
This would include the orphan shares which represent the liability of
dissolved or insolvent corporations or individuals as well as the costs
of investigation to identify PRPs, the costs of locating PRPs, and the
costs of serving PRPs. 47 This principle may seem inherently unfair to
defendant PRPs who have to shoulder the burden of cleanup of fellow
contaminators who cannot pay. To do away with joint and several
liability, however, which is what would occur in CERCLA litigation in
which a PRP could only bring a section 113 action, provides a tremen-
dous disincentive for parties ordered under section 106 to clean up a
site. If liability is several only, a party ordered under section 106 may
not recover its total costs."4
In 1994, the Second Session of the 103d Congress proposed vari-
ous amendments to CERCLA, 49 one of which is relevant to the issue
of joint and several liability.' 50 In determining the allocation of re-
spective shares among all PRPs, a designated allocator has the power
to assign orphan shares.'51
145. See Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 22.
146. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967. "[Investigating] significantly benefitted the entire
cleanup effort and served a statutory purpose apart from the reallocation of costs. These kinds
of activities are recoverable costs of response clearly distinguishable from litigation expenses."
Id.
147. See Standing Under Superfund, supra note 9, at 180.
148. Id.
149. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
150. Id. at § 409.
151. Id. at § 409 (d). The bill reads:
(4) Identification Of Orphan Shares.
The allocator may determine that a percentage share for the facility is specifically at-
tributable to an "orphan share." The orphan share may only consist of the following:
(A) shares attributable to hazardous substances that the allocator determines, on
the basis of information presented, to be specifically attributable to identified but insol-
vent or defunct responsible parties who are not affiliated with any allocation party;
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Currently, if joint and several liability is imposed upon defendant
PRPs, these PRPs must absorb the orphan shares into their total ex-
pense. If a pro tanto credit rule is applied, the last party to settle runs
the risk of having to shoulder the entire remaining portion of the dam-
age including all orphan shares. 52
The 103d Congress proposed a $300 million maximum allocation
to pay the orphan shares of each cleanup. 53 This proposal would
have allowed plaintiff PRPs to take advantage of joint and several lia-
bility with respect to the total assessable liability among solvent de-
fendant PRPs while still recovering the amount assigned to insolvent
or dissolved defendant PRPs. This proposal would have adhered to
the common law principles that courts applied prior to SARA and
that SARA sought to protect while accommodating the underlying in-
tent of Congress in enacting CERCLA. In addition, the proposed leg-
islation would have shielded solvent defendant PRPs from the
inherent unfairness of shouldering a burden in excess of their propor-
tionate liability within a joint and several scheme. Unfortunately, the
amendments covered a variety of subjects within CERCLA, and the
entire proposal was rejected by Congress.
CERCLA should be amended to abolish the unnecessary and
confusing expressed contribution action under section 113. Further,
Congress should add a section which expressly mandates that courts
apply the common law principles of contribution to a bifurcated trial
scheme, and to establish a government fund to pay the orphan shares.
(B) the difference between the aggregate shares that the allocator determines, on
the basis of the information presented, are specifically attributable to contributors of
municipal solid waste subject to the limitations in section 107(a)(5)(D) of this title, and
the share actually assumed by those parties in any settlements with the United States
pursuant to subsection 122(g) of this title, including the fair market value of in-kind
services provided by a municipality; and
(C) the difference between the aggregate share that the allocator determines, on
the basis of information presented, is specifically attributable to parties with a limited
ability to pay response costs and the share actually assumed by those patties in any
settlements with the United States pursuant to subsection 122(b) of this title.
The orphan share shall not include shares attributable to hazardous substances that the
allocator cannot attribute to any identified party. Such shares shall be distributed
among the allocation parties.
Id.
152. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 763,764 (N.D. Okla.
1993) ("The pro tanto approach is contained in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act (UCATA), which provides contribution protection to all settling parties and reduces the
amount of the non-settling parties' liability by the dollar amount of the settlements.").
153. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 409 (e) (1994).
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In doing so, the intent of Congress in enacting CERCLA and promul-
gating SARA would be realized. Additionally, Congress would estab-
lish the equitable considerations a court must apply if the damage to a
site is indivisible, thus making liability joint and several.
VII. CONCLUSION
As CERCLA currently reads, a PRP who incurs response costs in
remedying a contaminated site has two expressed causes of action to
recover these costs: a cost recovery action under section 107, and a
contribution action under section 113. A cost recovery action affords
the PRP three distinct advantages: a greater scope of recovery due to
the imposition of joint and several liability among defendant PRPs; a
longer statute of limitations; and no statutory bar to cost recovery.
Courts usually interpret CERCLA to imply that a PRP is entitled
to bring only one of the two expressed causes of action. The current
trend is to disallow a PRP the right to bring a section 107 cost recov-
ery solely upon its status as a non-innocent, potentially liable party.
This interpretation contravenes not only the original text of CER-
CLA, which provided for only a section 107 cost recovery action, but
also the SARA amendments, which merely sought to codify the devel-
opment of CERCLA litigation from its enactment. The addition of a
contribution action was meant to clarify and confirm the imposition of
a bifurcated trial scheme in which liability was assessed under sec-
tion 107 in the liability phase, then common law contribution was ap-
plied during the cost allocation phase.
SARA and its expressed contribution action have failed misera-
bly. Instead of following the law as it had developed in the courts,
courts have begun to deny a PRP the right to bring a section 107 cost
recovery action solely based upon its standing as PRPs. To solve this
judicial conundrum, Congress must amend CERCLA to eliminate the
SARA amendments which apply to contribution completely. In doing
so, Congress must insert a provision in CERCLA similar to the Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence regarding privilege allowing for the application
of common law principles to augment the statute. The original text of
CERCLA and a supplementary provision which recognizes the appli-
cation of common law principles is the best way to restore CERCLA
to a state in which the original intent of the drafters is respected.
Lastly, the 103d Congress proposed an amendment to CERCLA
which tried to strike a balance between the application of joint and
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several liability as an incentive to private parties and its inherent un-
fairness in imposing upon defendant PRPs greater liability by making
them pay for the orphan shares. Setting up a fund to pay for the or-
phan shares is in the best interest of all parties. A plaintiff PRP is
certainly no worse off, and a defendant PRP will not have to bear the
liability of dissolved or insolvent corporations.
Richard D. Buckley, Jr.
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